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There is a tendency to think that sexuality is either constructed or detennined; to think that 
if it is constructed, it is in some sense free, and if it is determined, it is in some sense fixed. 
These oppositions do not describe the complexity of what is at stake in any effort to take 
account of the conditions under which sex and sexuality are assumed. The 'performative' 
dimension of construction is precisely the forced reiteration of norms." 
Judith Butler, Bodies That MaUer (94-5) 
We define bodies in the first place only when we are conflicted, as a society and often 
within ourselves. 
Alan Hyde, Bodies ofLaw (11) 
I N mid-March 1997, a radio report told the story of a male infant whose penis had been excised as the result of an accident during a circumcision procedure. In 
consultation with physicians, the parents requested that the child, after additional 
surgery and ongoing hormone therapy, be "reaSSigned" as female. l The news 
reporter observed that the case, which came to be known as theJohnlJoan case after 
the child's female and male pseudonyms, was especially interesting because the 
child-then reassigned a young girl-had a twin brother and hence had been used by 
medical psychologist John Money as a case study of the social constructedness of 
gender.2 Indeed, because Money repeatedly reported in both the popular and 
medical press on the success of the reassignment, the case had been pointed to for 
years as key evidence by those holding a social construction view of gender. 
However, the report went on, a recent article in a medical journal was claiming 
that the child had never comfortably accepted the reassignment and had in fact 
actively resisted living as a girl. Finally being told as a teenager that "she" was 
originally a boy, the youth made an immediate decision to be surgically and socially 
reassigned once again, this time as male. The report implied that, because the 
John/Joan case had been lauded for years as compelling evidence of gender's 
constructionism, the discovery of the eventual outcome of the case was evidence that 
theories of constructionists were wrong-gender was instead essentially determined 
by the body. Indeed, over the next several days and months, reports in multiple 
publications, with headlines such as "Sexual Identity Not Pliable After All, Report 
Says" (Angier AI), "Rethinking Gender Identity" (MacLean's 31), and "The Basis of 
Sexual Identity" (Roan El), drew the conclusion that gender is not primarily a 
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matter of social condition but rather a matter of biologically determined impulses. 
The case was said to i1lustrate that "The experts had it all wrong" (Gorman 83). As 
Time put it, gender is a matter of the "brain" rather than of cultural conditioning, of 
natural imperatives rather than of cultural roles and social conditioning.3 
As the case continued to unfold in academic and trade journals, the arguments 
consistently illustrated the lack of complexity that Judith Butler points to in the 
quotation opening this essay. Indeed, what debate there was on the case posited it in 
the starkly contrasting terms of gender as purely social, or of gender as essentially 
tied to the body's given sex, with the "determined" side of the binary posited as 
clearly winning the day. As Lauren Berlant might note of this case, the tension that it 
illustrates around gender "reveals a desire for identity to be ontological, dead to 
history, not in any play or danger of representation, anxiety, improvisation, desire or 
panic" (72). 
In her well known deconstruction of the sex-gender (essentialism-construction­
ism) binary (and the complication of gender as performative),Judith Butler provides 
a lens through which to complicate the scientific and public arguments that took 
place around the body and activities ofJohn/Joan. As Butler notes, the problem with 
the sex-gender division is that it establishes the sexed body as "natural," existing 
prediscursively, prior to culture, "a politically neutral surface on which culture acts" 
(Gender 7). While Butler argues that "sex" can never be prediscursive and thereby 
never be either apolitical or determinate, she also argues against seeing gendered 
behavior as freely open for play by any individual. Rather, to posit gender and 
gender behaviors as performative is to see it as "a ritualized production, a ritual 
reiterated under and through constraint, under and through the force of prOhibition 
and taboo, with the threat of ostracism [...J compelling the shape of the production, 
but not [...J determining it fully in advance" (Bodies 95). As a result, the project of a 
political genealogy of gender becomes one of noting the forces that turn contingent 
acts into naturalistic necessities, and of noting how various possibilities for different 
gender behaviors "have been forcibly foreclosed by the various reifications of 
gender that have constituted its contingent ontologies" (Gender 33). 
As I will show, the arguments surrounding the John/Joan case-a case which had 
the potential to cause "gender trouble" by "subverting and displacing those natural­
ized and reified notions of gender that support masculine hegemony and hetero­
sexual power" (Butler Gender 33)-illustrate the disciplinary power of the ritualized 
production of gender regardless of the "gender theory" held by those arguing. That is, 
while some observers and figures involved in the case treat John/joan's physical 
appearance and behaviors primarily as biological signs of sex, and others treat these 
same appearances and behaviors as contingent signifiers, both rely so uniftrmly on the 
same Signifier-signified relations that they become crystallized as natural signs. In short, 
even if one deconstructs the sex-gender differentiation with Butler on a theoretical 
leve~ arguments over the case provide a body of public and scientific discourse 
which consistently offers ritualized reiterations of a binaristic system of sex-based, 
male-female differences. To put this in the words ofJudith Halberstam, rather than 
naively celebrating gender fluidity, we need to begin to talk again "about the ways in 
which desire and gender and sexuality tend to be remarkably rigid" (290). 
Hence, rhetorically and culturally, the public discussion of the case creates a 
complex body of discourse that calls for critical attention, especially by gender critics 
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who hold a performative position. This case, a case which held the potential to 
problematize naturalized categories that tie gender to sex, consistently worked 
instead to reify binaristic expectations of gendered behavior. In effect, both those 
positing gender as constructed and those who posited sex as natural (or at least 
primarily determinate) used the same evidence, the same set of signifiers, to support 
their arguments onJohn/Joan's successlfailure in fitting his/her gender role. These 
signifiers make up a portion of what Sabrina Petra Ramet refers to as gender culture: 
"a society's understanding ofwhat is possible, proper, and perverse in gender-linked 
behavior" (2).4 Moreover, these signifiers are the same "forced reiteration of norms" 
(Butler Bodies 94) that we all face-the same reiterations that impel and sustain Our 
own gender performances. 
In the following sections of this essay, I provide a reading of theJ ohn/Joan case as 
it was reported in "scientific" and mass media print outlets.s By looking at both sets 
of discourses (from 1969 to the present), I develop a critical reading of the evidence 
of proper gender behavior utilized in medical journals and will note the types of 
evidence that signal key public understandings of gender behavior as they become 
translated and crystallized in popular news magazines and newspapers. First, I argue 
that, for both those who discuss the case publicly from a constructivist position and 
those who hold that gender is primarily an expression of the body's sex,6 gender is 
seen as being successfully or unsuccessfully behaved/expressed through particular 
uses of clothing, hair style, body orientation (notably during urination), and physical 
activities. It is these activities which make up in large part the reiteration of gender 
norms. Secondly, I discuss specific ways that the case articulates a link between 
successful gender behavior and heterosexual desire. Third, I discuss the social and 
moral implications of the bio-basic gender ideology implied by the contemporary 
public arguments of the John/Joan case (i.e., one cannot successfully work against 
one's biological gender impulses). Finally, as a related issue, I discuss the problem­
atic ways that feminism and women's studies are constructed by observers of the 
case, the ways in which "feminism" is itself articulated with a particular view of 
gender. In short, I am interested in investigating and "troubling" the way gender 
signifiers are re-naturalized (re-signed) in discussions oftheJohn/Joan case and want 
to explore the pOSSible implications of this re-naturalization of gender given that the 
cultural prescriptions of gender influence each of us, subtly and overtly, on a daily 
basis. 7 
Re-Signing Gender 
In a celebrated essay, Suzanne Kessler ("Medical") illustrated the "medical 
construction ofgender" by investigating the lOgiC physicians use in making decisions 
about the case management of intersexed infants (hermaphrodites).8 By looking at 
both the medical research that has proliferated on the topic, and at the practices of 
physicians (e.g., their "talk" about intersexed children amongst themselves and 
when advising parents of intersexed children of possible options), Kessler makes a 
number of observations about the medical construction of gender. First, in line with 
Judith Butler's observation of the always already discursive body, Kessler notes that 
physicians make decisions about which gender the child should be assigned based 
on (heteronormative) cultural factors, even though they claim a biological basis for 
gender in the decision making process. That is, while physicians might note in 
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conversation and in their research that biological factors (e.g., chromosome make­
up) should be the major factor in the determination of gender assignment, "biologi­
cal factors are often preempted in their deliberations by such cultural factors as the 
'correct' length of the penis and capacity of the vagina" (3). In making decisions on 
whether to surgically reassign the intersexed child as male or female, physicians 
make the primary determinant of their decision the child's ability to fit in socially 
with whatever body can be constructed. More, while an intersexed body is arguably 
a "natural body" in that it developed without intervention, doctors construct gender 
rather than discover it in the case of hermaphrodites by making decisions on what 
"bad" genitals need to be removed and what "good" genitals need to be repaired or 
made "normal." Hence, Kessler argues, doctors conceive of male and female as 
natural gender categories and attempt to create male or female bodies out of 
ambiguous genitalia.9 As Kessler notes, "language and imagery help create and 
maintain a specific view ofwhat is natural about the two genders, and, I would argue, 
about the very idea of gender-that it consists of two exclusive types: female and 
male" (25).10 
While I intend to draw on Kessler's insights, the case of John/Joan provides a 
different arena for the study of gender, both because of its publiC nature and because 
it involved a child who was born with unambiguous genitalia. That is, by investigat­
ing both medical and public discussions of the John/Joan case-and by paying 
attention to what evidence from the medical literature is crystallized in mass 
mediated discourses, we are provided with a view of broad cultural articulations of 
gender signifiers and gender behaviors. Again, as the case unfolds, the gender 
specific constraints on behavior are parallel, regardless of whether the descriptions 
are coming from a constructionist or essentialist position. More, the behaviors are 
said to be visible as markers "on" the body (e.g., clothing, hair styles) and as markers 
that reveal impulses "in" the body (e.g., body orientations, personality traits).ll 
While the arguments I look at below posit the behaviors in either primarily 
constructionist or primarily essentialist terms, we may ultimately see these markers, 
gestures, and acts, as Butler reminds us, as "performative in the sense that the 
essence or identity that they otherwise purport to express are fabrications manufac­
tured and sustained through corporeal signs and other discursive means" (Gender 
136). Further, to see these markers, gestures, and acts as performative exposes a 
politics that is occluded by the constructionist and essentialist positions taken up 
around the case. 
The representation of the case as an example of gender constructionism begins 
when John Money, the physician who carried out John/Joan's reassignment and 
observed the case for years, writes about the case or is quoted by others in its early 
stages in the mid to late 1960s.12 On the other hand, Milton Diamond and Keith 
Sigmundson (and others who take up their position in the 1990s) represent the 
"natural" position by suggesting that "the brain" or body determines gender and 
that individuals have impulses as male or female that outweigh social upbringing. 13 
WhetherJohn/Joan is viewed as being successfully reassigned as female or as having 
struggled against the reassignment, however, what Money sees as the signifiers of 
what it means to act male or female are identical to what Diamond and Sigmundson 
see as the signs of male or female-ness. Hence, when their discussions are made 
public, the signifiers of dominant gender performance are again reified and natural­
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ized as signs of the body's gender/sex. Whether constructed or essential, the markers 
of gender behavior are reified on binary grounds; identical iterations of gender 
behavior are stabilized. 
In Money's early comments on the case in Man and Woman, Boy and Girl, he notes 
thatJohn/Joan's parents implemented the change of sexual assignment of the child 
initially (pre-surgery) with a change of name, clothing and hairstyle. Relying on 
letters of success as reported by the child's mother, Money notes that the effects of 
these changes helped feminize the child. For Money, signs of the reassignment's 
success could be found in the child's "clear preference for dresses over slacks" and 
her pride "in her long hair" (119). Money quotesJohn/Joan's mother reporting that 
Joan "just loves to have her hair set; she could sit under the drier all day long to have 
her hair set" (120). Significantly, when Time initially reports on the case, the 
anonymous author employs the quotations concerningJohn/Joan's love of haVing 
her hair set and her predilection for "frilly" clothes as the primary and convincing 
evidence that the child had successfully become a girl ("Biological" 34).14 As time 
passes and Money provides updates about the case in trade books such as Sexual 
Signatures, he continues to emphasize the child's interest in feminine clothing and 
hair as a powerful sign of the success of the gender change. WhenJohn/Joan reached 
age 5, Money notes that the child successfully preferred "dresses to pants, enjoyed 
wearing her hair ribbons, bracelets and frilly blouses, and loved being her daddy's 
little sweetheart" (97). In short, taking constructivist positions on gender, Money and 
those who write about the case from Money's position use the child's successful use 
of common gender signifiers as evidence that gender is purely a matter of how one is 
socialized (in short, "becauseJohn/Joan likes dresses, she acts/is female"). 
On the other hand, when the case is reported as a failure in 1997, Diamond and 
Sigmundson employ these same signifiers as signs, as evidence that the reassignment 
had in fact always been a failure, that John/Joan rejected "feminine" clothing and 
hair styles because "she" had in fact always been a male. In Diamond and 
Sigmundson's report, John/joan's mother is quoted observing that, for multiple 
reasons, including her desire that the reassignment be successful, she did not provide 
Money with the truth aboutJohn/Joan's behavior. What is significant here is not that 
Diamond and Sigmundson get closer to "the truth" ofJohn/joan's behavior as a 
child but instead that the gender signifiers used in their reports of the case's failure 
are the same ones employed by Money in his descriptions of the case's success. For 
example,John/Joan's mother notes in Diamond and Sigmundson's essay that she 
"put this beautiful little dress on him [...J and he immediately tried to rip it off; I 
think he knew it was a dress and that it was for girls and he wasn't a girl" (300). She 
also notes thatJohn!Joan showed more desire to shave with her father than to use 
makeup or set hair with her mother (300). In mass mediated articles that draw upon 
Diamond and Sigmundson's report, this evidence is crystallized as illustrating the 
case's failure, as if these gender signifiers are linked naturally with sex. In effect, this 
position reverses Money's causal link to argue, "She doesn't like dresses because she 
is male." For example, the New York Times reports that John/Joan's "new identity 
never took. Joan would tear off her dresses, reject dolls and seek out male friends. 
Her mother would try to get Joan to imitate her makeup ritual; instead, she 
mimicked her father shaving" (Angier A12). The shaving story is repeated in articles 
in Maclean's, the Los Angeles Times (Roan) and Time (which also repeats the clothing 
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story) (Gorman 83). The Rolling Stone essay, the lengthiest and most substantial 
retelling of the John/Joan case (and one supportive of Diamond and Sigmundson's 
position), goes into great detail on many of these signifiers of gender. For example, 
the reassigned adult male 'john" is described by authorJohn Colapinto as "a wiry 
young man dressed in a jean jacket and scuffed work boots" (56). Further, John/ 
Joan's brother, Kevin, retells the story of Joan's desire to shave, and his mother 
recounts Joan's attempt to tear off the dress. In general, the family notes that 
John/Joan never revealed any desire to wear makeup and shared little concern with 
hair care (64-5). Rolling Stone essayistJohn Colapinto consistently emphasizes that 
John/Joan was never comfortable with her feminine hair style, her clothing, or 
feminine toys. Indeed, the article includes an enlarged quotation in which John/ 
Joan's mother notes, " 'It was a pretty, lacy little dress,' Linda says. joan was ripping 
at it, trying to tear it off. I thought, 'Oh my God, she knows she's a boy' " (p. 64). 
Later, whenJohn/Joan is reported to have decided to live according to his/her own 
desires, Colapinto reports thatJoan began not only wearing a jean jacket and work 
boots, but "her hair was unwashed, uncombed, and matted" (Colapinto 73). More, 
after meeting and interviewing the reassigned maleJohn/Joan in a Hard Rock Cafe, 
authorJohn Colapinto translates John's physical behavior as unequivocal evidence 
ofJohn's "natural" sex: "The strongest impression I was left with [...J was ofJohn's 
intense, unequivocal masculinity. His gestures, walk, attitudes, tastes, vocabulary­
none of them betrayed the least hint that he had been raised as a girl" (Colapinto 95). 
Again, I am not suggesting that there is no significance toJohn/Joan's preferences 
of clothing or hairstyle. Rather, what is significant is that the authors who see the case 
as a success and the ones who see it as a failure do not provide two different 
interpretations of the same event but instead two different actions surrounding the 
same specific set of signifiers. The assumption for Money is that the appropriate 
enactment of these signifiers is evidence of successful gender reassignment while for 
those taking up the biological (sex) position,John/Joan's rejection of these signifiers 
is a sign of the natural link between sex and gender. The articulation between 
signifiers and gender performance is so tightly bound, so "naturalized," thatJohn/ 
Joan's rejection or embracing of "girlish" hair and clothing is evidence of her 
rejection or embracing of a gender identity. Both Money and Diamond and 
Sigmundson, articulating the constructionist and essentialist positions on gender, 
"read gestures as expression of 'authentic' selves, performances as identities" 
(Phelan 3). In either case, the signifiers themselves are reified. Further, these 
signifiers are important not only to the researchers involved in the case, but, perhaps 
more significantly, they are repeatedly employed in mass mediated reports of the 
case, illustrating their continuing significance in the public's understanding of gender 
performance and the overall contours of gender culture. 
Next, John/Joan's masculine or feminine behaviors are judged on the basis of a 
number of issues dealing with bodily containment or excess (orientation), with the 
tendency toward containment (e.g., neatness, gentleness, seated urination) associ­
ated with feminity and tendencies toward excessiveness (e.g., loudness, rough and 
tumble play, standing urination) associated with masculini,ty. While my earlier 
discussion dealt with signifiers (or, signs, as the case may be) "on" the body, this 
section deals with signifiers "in" the body (e.g., impulses). In Money's earliest 
"popular" report on the case (Money and Ehrhardt), he makes a number of 
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observations about containment of the body, many of which are highlighted in the 
Time article that extracted portions of the report ("Biological"). Money notes: 
"Related to being dressed nicely is the sense of neatness. The mother stated that her 
daughter by four and a half years of age was much neater than her brother [...j 'She 
likes for me to wipe her face. She doesn't like to be dirty, and yet my son is quite 
different.' 'I've never seen a little girl so neat and tidy as she can be when she wants to 
be' " (Money and Ehrhardt 119). Further, John/Joan is said to enjoy helping the 
mother keep the house and kitchen clean while the twin brother has no interest in 
the same activities (Money and Ehrhardt 121, "BiolOgical"). Th.ree years later, in 
Sexual Signatures, Money notes that while John/Joan is an aggressive child, her 
aggressiveness is expressed "in fussing over her brother [...j like a mother hen" 
(Money and Tucker 97). She is described as "neat and dainty," often attempting "to 
help in the kitchen" (Money and Tucker 97). 
The issue of neatness and containment carries over to the restroom where, as 
Money reports, while John/Joan had tried "standing up" to urinate at age two, "as 
many girls do," she learned to successfully urinate sitting down after discovering that 
when she tried copying her brother's urination style, she made "an awful mess" 
(Money and Ehrhardt 120). As I will illustrate, the issue of howJohn/Joan urinates/ 
desired to urinate becomes more significant in the 1997 retelling of her life story. In 
this way, the case illustrates Marjorie Garber's employment (13-7) of Lacan's notion 
of "urinary segregation." Accordingly, despite all other differences men and women 
may have with other men and women, the act of urination, as symbolized by 
restroom doors, acts culturally as an imperative tie between all men and between all 
women (Garber 13-7). 
While such claims for gender might not be surprising given the early and mid 
1970s dates of some of these publications (although I actually would have assumed 
that their stereotypicality would be a bit out of step even for the 1970s), the same 
signifiers are employed in articles pointing to the failure of the John/Joan reassign­
ment. For example, Milton Diamond summarized a BBe documentary that focused 
on the case and noted that, from what the reporters had been able to discover about 
John/Joan, the reassignment had been a failure; the girl GohnlJoan) was living 
unhappily and showed signs of being masculine. In the documentary, one of the 
psychiatrists familiar with the case noted the masculine wayJohn/Joan moved: "The 
child [...j has a very masculine gait, er, looks quite masculine" (Diamond "Sexual 
Identity, Monozygotic" 183). In Diamond and Sigmundson's later report on the 
failure of the case, they made a number of observations aboutJohn/Joan's early life, 
many of which again focused on the lack of bodily containmentJohnlJoan showed 
as a child. The two noted that 'Joan did not shun rough and tumble sports" (300). 
More, they quote her mother observing that, whileJohn/Joan may have looked like 
a girl, "When he started moving or talking, that gave him away, and the awkward­
ness and incongruities become apparent" (301). In artides in Time and the Los Angeles 
Times, we find repeated the evidence thatJohn/Joan was clearly masculine because 
she enjoyed the rough and tumble play involved in climbing trees (Gorman 83, see 
also Roan E8; Diamond "Sexual Identity and Sexual"). In the Rolling Stone essay on 
the case, John/Joan's brother, Kevin, observes: "When I say there was nothing 
feminine aboutJoan, I mean there was nothing feminine. She walked like a boy. She 
talked about guy things, didn't give a crap about cleaning home, getting married, 
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wearing make up. We both wanted to play with guys, build forts, and have snowball 
fights and play army" (Colapinto 64-5). 
Further, the issue of urination again is employed here (and in almost all of the 
mass media reports concerning the case) as an important sign ofJohn/Joan's gender 
and its natural link to sex. Diamond and Sigmundson note that John/Joan began 
urinating standing up, despite the fact that others didn't want her to: "At school, at 
age 14 years, she was caught standing to urinate in the girls' bathroom so often that 
the other girls refused to allow her entrance" (300). As John Colapinto quotes the 
adult maleJohn/Joan: "It was no big deal; it was easier for me to do that. Just stand 
up and go" (73). The same evidence is raised in the New York Times (Angier A18), 
Time (Gorman 83), and the Los Angeles Times (Roan El). 
Again, then, just as with the child's clothing and hair style, a single set of signifiers 
(the gait, the gestures, body movements, rough and tumble play, and the stance for 
urination) are used to illustrate masculinity and femininity in binaristic fashion, 
regardless of whether gender is posited as a product of socialization or of the 
materiality of the body (its sex). In terms of gender culture, we clearly see in the 
argument over John/Joan's body the signifiers that are employed in the judgments 
people make of each other and of themselves in their evaluations of gender 
performance. 
Gender and Assumed Heterosexuality 
Paralleling Judith Butler, Elspeth Probyn notes that "Personhood is always 
gendered" (2). One of the reminders that theJ ohn/Joan case brings to the fore is that, 
as we are gendered (or "sexed" to use Probyn's term), so are we simultaneously 
situated in relation to a "compulsory heterosexuality" (Rich).IS In clearer terms, 
perhaps, Butler notes that "the institution of a compulsory and naturalized hetero­
sexuality requires and regulates gender as a binary relation in which the masculine 
term is differentiated from a feminine term, and this differentiation is accomplished 
through the practices of heterosexual desire" (Gender 22-3). In this case, both 
predicted and performed heterosexual desire (and the rejection of homosexual 
desire) operate rhetorically as evidence ofJohn/Joan's "real" gender. For Money 
and the reports that articulate his position, Joan is "truly" a girl when she desires 
boys as partners; for those holding sex as essential,John is proven "truly" to be a 
male when he aggressively pursues heterosexual relations with women. 
Despite the fact that both Money and Diamond argue that sexual desire is 
somewhat autonomous from "sex" (e.g., neither suggests that males absolutely must 
be attracted to females and vice-versa), both of them actively utilize evidence of 
heterosexuality in this case as strong evidence of John's/Joan's proper gender 
behavior. More, as I illustrate below, the nature ofJohn/Joan's heterosexual desire is 
drawn up in aggressive terms and becomes some of the most often repeated 
evidence in scientific reports about the case. Indeed, from the time thatJ ohn/Joan 
was first reassigned as female until his chosen reassignment as male, the question of 
sexuality and its significance within the debate over gender's constructedness/ 
naturalness is raised. In short, similar to the discussions of the physical signifiers of 
gender, what John/Joan does (or will do) with hislher body sexually is utilized 
rhetorically as evidence for the success or failure of the reassignment. 
When Money first writes about the case in 1972 in Man and Woman, Boy and Girl 
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(Money and Ehrhardt), he assumes the importance of heterosexuality and future 
motherhood for the child's proper gender behavior when he notes the importance of 
informingJohn/Joan early on that while she could not have children naturally, "she 
wouldbecome a mother by adoption, one day, when she married and wanted to have 
a family" (119, emphasis mine). When the child's mother goes on to note in this 
same work that she had explained to the twin brother that he would someday 
become a daddy "and grow muscles so he could take care of mommy and baby, and 
go to work in a car like daddy does [...J I've explained to each what their function 
will be as a grown-up, [...J" (120), Money follows by noting that the mother 
consistently gave the twins good examples of the "wife" and "husband" roles (121). 
Similarly, Money notes with approval that the twin son would sometimes smack 
John/Joan on the fanny as a sign of affection (121), illustrating that each was learning 
their proper gender behavior. Further, in an interesting twist in which Money 
assumes thatJohn/Joan will become interested in a male sex partner, he notes that 
cases like this one "represent what is, to all intents and purposes, experimentally 
planned and iatrogenically induced homosexuality. [... j Postsurgically, it is no 
longer homosexuality on the criterion of the external sex organs nor of the sex of 
replacement hormonal puberty" (235). The assumption Money is making here is 
that, given a female body and raised as a girl, John/Joan would naturally choose a 
male partner. 
This same theme continues in Money's popular and scientific reports and is 
crystallized in mass mediated accounts of the case. Further, Money and mass 
mediated reports onJohn/Joan's heterosexuality also point to other cases to reify the 
articulation of heterosexual desire and proper gender behavior. For example, the 
Time magazine report on the case quotes Money making note of a case of two 
hermaphrodites who were reassigned, one as male and one as female: "The girl 
therefore reached preadolescence expecting to marry a man; in fact, she already has 
a steady boyfriend. The boy by contrast has a girl friend and 'fitted easily into the 
stereotype of the male role in marriage' even though 'he and his partner would both 
have two X-chromosomes' " ("Biological" 34). In an account of the case in 1975, 
Money notes that the decision about John/Joan's reassignment as a girl had to be 
made early enough in the child's life so that her "erotic interest would almost 
certainly direct itself toward the opposite sex later on" (Money and Tucker 94). In 
each example, the assumption is that a successful gender reassignment would be 
signified in part by heterosexual desire, and in persistently reiterating this link, its 
disciplinary strength is maintained. . 
When the case is discussed in 1997, and we learn that John/Joan chose to be 
reassigned as male, heterosexual prowess is again emphasized; this time, however, 
they focus on his desire for, and attractiveness to, women. Similar to the arguments 
made by, and in support of, Money's position, heterosexuality is again used as 
evidence of proper gender behavior despite the fact that Diamond's position does 
not necessarily entail it. In its most basic form, Milton Diamond's position on gender 
identity is that the hormones accompanying a child's gender, both while the child is 
in the womb and after birth, create gender identity such that one cannot simply 
reassign a child after birth (for Diamond, this is the case with both hermaphrodites 
and those cases like John/Joan in which the reassignment came as the result of an 
accident). While Diamond is clear at times that he sees sexual preference as 
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somewhat autonomous from gender (see, e.g., Diamond "Sexual Identity and 
Sexual Orientation" 207), he also persistently provides examples of cases which 
imply compulsory heterosexuality (e.g., cases of males with ambiguous genitalia 
who were raised as females, but develop male genitalia and sexual desires for 
females as they go through puberty). Diamond's assumption is a reiteration of what 
Alice Dreger notes is the historical position of those who study cases of "doubtful 
sex" (hermaphroditism). As she observes, at the turn of this century, it was an 
unstated assumption that a body's natural sex would reveal itself through hetero­
sexual desire: "The assumption that true males-even those with mistaken identity­
would naturally desire females, and true females males, pervaded the medical 
literature on doubtful sex" (88). Indeed, in the case ofJohn/Joan, Diamond and mass 
mediated reports sympathetic to his position perSistently crystallize John/Joan as 
aggressively heterosexual. 
In Diamond and Sigmundson's report on the case, they provide a heterosexual 
theme that is the most repeated piece of evidence in the case as it unfolds in mass 
mediated reports. The two note that afterJohn/Joan chose to be reassigned as male 
at age 15, he began to make other changes: "At 16 years, to attract girls, John 
obtained a windowless van with a bed and bar. Girls, who as a group had been 
teasingJoan, now began to have a crush onJohn" (300). This signifier of the use of a 
van-a windowless van with a bar and a bed-to pursue heterosexual activities so 
clearly resonates with popular cultural notions of gender and sexuality that it 
appears repeatedly in articles about the case. It is as if, in bed, hidden by the lack of 
windows, John's "true" sexual desire would express itself. For example, in a New 
York Times report that extends the aggressiveness of his heterosexual desire, the 
author notes that afterJoan becameJohn, "He got himself a van with a bar in it. Dr. 
Diamond said in an interview, 'He wanted to lasso some ladies' " (Angier AI2). The 
article goes on to discuss John/Joan's marriage to a woman and adoption of her 
children, emphasizingJohn/Joan's ability to have intercourse and orgasm with his 
newly constructed penis (AI2). Similarly, during an interview on ABC's PrimeTime 
Live, the adultJohn is asked ifhe is able to have normal sexual relations with his wife 
using his reconstructed penis-a question which should be irrelevant toJohn's "true" 
gender ("Boy"). US News and World Report'sJohn Leo similarly reports that after his 
surgery, "At age 16, he bought a van with a bed and bar and started to pursue girls. 
At 25, he married a woman with three children [...J" (p. 17). 
Finally, John Colapinto's Rolling Stone essay, in addition to recounting the same 
stories aboutJohn/Joan's coming out as a heterosexual, reports that, despite the fact 
that Money talked about John/Joan as heterosexual in his published reports about 
the case, he had already askedJohn/Joan's parents if they would have trouble raising 
a lesbian (Colapinto 70). In this way, Colapinto implies thatJohn/Joan had always 
been attracted to women sexually and hence, using a heterosexual logic, had always 
been male. Just as Money employs John/Joan's heterosexuality as a sign of the 
Success of the child's reassignment, Colapinto's essay employs 'John'S" heterosexu­
ality (and 'Joan's" potential homosexuality) as evidence of its failure. In both cases, 
heterosexuality is signified-indeed emphasized-as a norm in the performance of 
gender (or, from the biological position, as an expression of the body's sex). One can 
safely assume given the hetero-normativity of popular media culture that ifJohn/ 
Joan had become a homosexual male after his reassignment to male, the case would 
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not be quite as clearly used as evidence of gender's biological determinism in that his 
performance of masculinity would not have been heterosexual masculinity. The 
disciplinary power of normative heterosexuality is powerful indeed. 
Re-naturalizing Gender: The Brain as Sex Organ 
It has become something of a commonplace to note that "the brain is the most 
important sexual organ" as a way to suggest that one's beauty, one's ultimate sexual 
attraction, lies more in how one holds oneself, how interesting one is "as a mind," 
than in the superficialities of the body. In the case ofJohnlJoan, this same phrase is 
repeatedly invoked, albeit to different ends. In the 1997 reports about the case, the 
resignifying of the brain as the very basis for gender and gender impulses implies 
that gender is natural (i.e., gender is sexed)-a product of the development of brain, 
body, and identity as the result of hormones and chromosomes. As Matjorie Garber 
notes of this type of argument, gender essentialism is alive and well in scientific and 
popular culture; it has simply moved from being "on" the body to being "in" the 
body (e.g., chromosomal) (l08). Indeed, despite the fact that Diamond (and Sigmund­
son) posit gender as determined by both nature (the body, the brain, hormones) and 
nurture (cultural pressures, influence),16 the case is reported repeatedly as if it 
provides evidence for a complete reversal of any argument for social pressures on 
the shaping of gender and gender performance. Much as will be seen in the 
articulation of feminism below, the case becomes one in which a totalizing of 
positions in mass media outlets turns this case into one in which the "brain" (its sex) 
is the sole determinant of gender. 
In William Reiner's article accompanying Diamond and Sigmundson's update on 
the John/Joan case, he notes that "the organ that appears to be critical to psycho­
sexual development and adaptation is not the external genital but the brain. If the 
brain knows its gender independent of social-environmental influences, then we 
need to be able to predict what that gender is" (225). While neither Reiner, nor 
Diamond and Sigmundson, are arguing that sexual identity is completely deter­
mined or "unpliable," the mass mediated representation of their position transforms 
their argument into an all or nothing proposition in which "nurture" is displaced. 
For example, the New York Times article on the case is titled "Sexual Identity Not 
Pliable After All, Report Says" (Angier), noting that the follow-up on theJohn/Joan 
case "suggests the opposite" of Money's theory: "A sense of being male or female is 
innate, immune to the interventions of doctors, ~herapists and parents" (Angier X). 
In such wording, gender is entirely innate, "the opposite" of Money's theory. 
Similarly, Maclean's notes that "despite everyone telling him constantly that he was a 
girl, [...J his brain knew he was a male" ("Rethinking" 31). Time notes that the 
follow-up study shows Money's experiment was "a total failure," that gender is 
determined by the brain (Gorman 83). PrimeTime Lives Nancy Snyderman notes 
that the lesson of the case is that gender identification "comes from the brain, not the 
genitals" and suggests that continued belief in the constructedness of gender in the 
wake of the failure is "bad science" ("Boy"). The Los Angeles Times observes that the 
case "provides stark evidence that a person's brain predetermines sexual identity­
not one's anatomy or social environment" (Roan E1). Finally, the Rolling Stone essay, 
titled "The True Story ofJohn/Joan," argues that the "case was a failure, the truth 
never reported" "the most important sex organ is not the genitals; it's the brain" (97). 
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Such comments assume that scientific study works on the basis of using singular 
cases to prove particular theories and disprove others, rather than as offering support 
for particular cases or the falsification of others. In this way, these publications 
produce a gender theory through a reading of one particular study, a study that is 
said to prove that gender is not pliable, that the brain is the sex organ that determines 
gender. 
The argument that the brain is the primary sex organ also implies an interesting 
moral equation. Toward the conclusion of the Rolling Stone analysis of the case, 
John/Joan makes the following observation about what his life has taught him about 
being a man: 
'From what I've been taught by my father,'John says, 'What makes you a man is: you treat 
your wife well, you put a roof over your family's head. You're a good father. Things like 
that add up much more to being a man than just bang bang bang-sex. I guessJohn Money 
would consider my children's biological fathers to be real men. But they didn't stick around 
to raise the children. [ did. That, to me, is a man' (Colapinto 97). 
While I have no desire to put committed fatherhood in a negative light, what is 
interesting about this comment, in combination with the way in which gender is 
constructed throughout the discourse of the case, is the Bnk made between the 
naturalization of gender behaviors and the moralizing of these behaviors. In effect, 
gender behaviors, from the activities one performs to the clothes one wears to the 
way one urinates, are configured here as being determined by the brain. Hence, our 
impulses to act in particular ways are pOSited as totally determined in this discourse­
men take wives, have children, and then provide homes for them. However, given 
our obvious ability to ignore our impulses/duties as men or women (i.e., not every 
"man" takes a wife or has children as John seems to indicate above; not every 
woman needs a roof put over her head by the man), our inability to enact these roles 
gets recast as an unwillingness to.perform gender correctly (including physical 
activities and erotic interests), an unwillingness that is seemingly posited as immoral. 
In the discourse of this case, gender impulses are constructed as determinate, and 
our willingness to work with or against them a matter of morality (i.e., being a "man" 
means being a good father rather than not having children, rather than being 
homosexual). Given the interconnections, in this case, of what gender means in 
terms of our life activities, our sexual desires, and our daily politics, John/Joan 
constructs a situation in which the more closely one follows traditional gender 
politics, the closer one is to behaving morally. Hence, discourses like those in this 
case that link gender behavior "scientifically" to a supposed sex work to reify the 
"prohibitions and taboo[s]" (Butler Bodies 95) that act to diSCipline and mark gender 
performances; a discourse that constructs gender behavior as SCientifically illustrated 
to be natural, turns "good" or "bad" performances according to patriarchal rules 
into moral or immoral behaviors, and strengthens the ritualized iterations of proper 
gender behavior. 
John/Joan and the Articulation of Feminism 
While the John/Joan case clearly calls for a critical reading of the way the 
discourse surrounding it continues to reify gender binarism and hetero-normativity, 
an ancillary but related articulation in this case concerns public representations of 
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feminism and the way in which it is rhetorically linked to the case in theory and in 
deed. From the first popular culture reporting of the John/Joan case in Time 
("Biological"), discursive links were made between the assumptions of the case and 
those of feminism/women's studies. This was certainly in part due to John Money's 
own alignment of his claims with theories he saw as supportive of "women's 
liberation." Despite the irony of the fact that Money's discourse ultimately reifies 
disciplinary gender signs, the case is used early on by Money and others as evidence 
for many of the claims of feminism (again, feminism here is an uncontested terrain). 
However, even while such claims are used to support feminism, the effects are 
complicated because, as I've noted above, (1) the "feminism" or "women's lib" 
articulated with theJohn/Joan case is a particular type offeminism that gets totalized 
as feminism as a whole and (2) once the case is articulated as evidence for feminism, 
later refutation of the success of the case is also seen as a refutation of feminism as a 
whole. 
In the 1973 article in Time, "Biological Imperatives," the author notes that the case 
"provides strong support for a major contention of women's liberationists: that 
conventional patterns of masculine and feminine behavior can be altered" (34). The 
report notes that, while some scientists might argue that the biological differences 
between men and women limit the flexibility of sex roles, "Money is convinced that 
almost all differences are culturally determined and therefore optional" (34). This 
passage in Time is referred to repeatedly as the case unfolds publicly over the next 
two decades, illustrating a cultural need to come to grips with the claims of feminism. 
Milton Diamond, in one of his brief refutations of the case in 1982, notes the Time 
passage and argues that the John/Joan case in fact requires more scrutiny both 
because it has been used as the basis on which many other children have had sex 
reassignments and because the case has been utilized in "numerous elementary 
psychology and social texts" as well as by Masters and Johnson to assert that "it is 
baSically nurture, not nature, that determines sexual identity as male or female and 
the attendant gender roles" ("Sexual Identity, Monozygotic" 182). Further, in 
Diamond and Sigmundson's 1997 article, they again quote the same passage from 
Time and assert that "SOciology, psychology and women's studies texts were 
rewritten" to fit Money's argument as were many "lay and social science writings" 
(300). Hence, Money's arguments and their distillation in Time become the basis on 
which the case is articulated as prOViding evidence for "women's studies" as a whole 
rather than providing evidence for a particular argument about gender. 
After Diamond and Sigmundson release their updated findings about the case, 
bringing on interest about the meaning of 'Joan's" reassignment as 'John," the link 
to feminism becomes problematic. Once again, the passage in Time that notes the 
case's link to women's studies is referred to or quoted directly in 1997 articles in Time 
(Gorman), Rolling Stone (Colapinto), and US News and World Report (Leo). Further, 
each of these articles notes that the case has been cited in numerous women's studies 
texts, and was used, asJohn Colapinto puts it, to "buttress the feminist daim that the 
observable differences in the tastes, attitudes and behaviors of men and women are 
attributable solely to cultural expectations" (66). In an essay that particularly trades 
on this connection in an extended fashion, John Leo in US News and World Report 
(who also quotes the same passage from Time) begins by observing the outcome of 
the case and the fact that "It has been cited over and over in psychological, medical 
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and women's studies textbooks as proof that, apart from obvious genital differences, 
babies are all born as sexual blank slates-male and female attributes are invented 
and applied by society. Now aU those texts will have to be rewritten" (17). However, 
Leo's argument does not stop at arguing that women's studies must now be 
rethought, but rather he reinserts feminism at the beginning of the case, making it 
liable for the very decision for the surgery: "Why was this disastrous experiment 
undertaken? One reason is that it's easier to construct a vagina than to reconstruct a 
penis. But another reason is just as obvious: It was a chance to prove a rising 
academic and feminist theory about gender [...J that almost all sex differences are 
culturally determined" (17). Leo notes that theJohn/Joan case allowed the creation 
of gender studies which sawall differences between men and women as "socially 
constructed by men to oppress women" (17). Mter positing feminism as the cause for 
the surgery and using the case as evidence that feminism is a failed ideology, Leo, 
borrowing from Daphne Patai, goes on to note that the case won't mean much to 
"campus feminists" who will "just shrug it off": "The whole point of being an 
ideologue is that new information doesn't disturb your worldview" (17). 
While it is certainly the case that a great many versions of feminism include the 
idea that gender roles are (at least in part) socially constructed, the argument 
presented by Leo and others is that feminism has claimed that every aspect ofgender 
is socially constructed. After totalizing "social roles" as feminism itself, he (and 
others) are then able to employ the "new outcome" oftheJohn/Joan case to suggest 
that feminism (again totalized) is completely intellectually bankrupt. Rather than 
taking this as an occasion for revision, it becomes an occasion for dismissal. 
As has been pointed out many times before, such arguments make one feminism 
out of the multiple feminisms. That is, while one might give very broad parameters 
of feminism to which a number of people could agree,17 specific theoretical 
assumptions concerning the relationship between gender, sex, identity, and behav­
ior are certainly open to a large variety of perspectives within different feminist 
positions (as well as other psycholOgical and philosophical positions). This case 
represents one more location where feminism as a concept is concretized in popular 
culture, where feminism is "performed" by a variety of people, many of whom are 
not themselves supportive of a feminist position. When one notes the many ways in 
which feminism is caricatured and dismissed in conversations in the academy and in 
the public sphere, the need for the careful articulation of any given stance is clear. 
Indeed, given the tight link built between the case and feminism, cultural critics and 
feminists could do worse in finding a point of articulation over which to struggle for 
feminism and to complicate its meanings. 
Conclusion 
Investigating the way theories of gender, espeCially those put forth by John 
Money, have influenced the way intersexed (hermaphrodite) children are assigned 
gender by physicians, Suzanne Kessler illustrated that such decisions are often made 
by doctors more on the basis of cultural signification than on the basis of biological 
concerns. For example, because of a cultural belief that it would be traumatic for a 
male to go through life with an unusually small penis, a decision might be made to 
remove the penis of such an intersexed child and construct a vagina in its place. 
While such a decision would be made on the basis of multiple cultural factors, the 
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issue would be presented to the parents, according to Kessler, as a biological issue. In 
essence, Kessler is arguing that physicians, faced with the material bodies of 
hermaphrodites, are influenced to see and interpret these bodies, and the possibili­
ties for such bodies, through the same gender culture lens that is pervasive to varying 
degrees in the way each of us, in the same historical communicative community, 
understand gender and its performance. 
By investigating the story ofJ ohn/Joan as it plays itself out on the level of civic 
mass mediated discourse (and its translation from the medical community to mass 
culture), we are able to see some of the ways our broad gender culture is constructed 
and struggled over. More, we are able to see some of the ways our gender culture not 
only affects the material bodies of intersexed infants but also the ways it affects and 
influences our interpretation of each other's behaviors and bodies, the way we all, to 
varying degrees, take part in the reiteration of the norms of gender binarism and 
normative heterosexuality (e.g., how we monitor the behaviors of others and of 
ourselves, how we discipline that behavior through force, ostracism, taboo, and the 
reiteration of normative gender assumptions). Ifwe see gender culture as a "society's 
understanding of what is possible, proper, and perverse in gender linked behavior, 
and more specifically, that set of values, mores, and assumptions which establishes 
which behaviors are to be seen as gender linked" (i.e., if gender culture is seen as the 
rules for gender performance and the morals of performing them well) (Ramet 2), we 
see here a case in which the rules for gender performance are laid bare. 
As we have seen, the rules for gender performance in this case are not only 
surprisingly traditional in form but also fairly rigid. Indeed, and this is key, the rules 
are so rigid that binaristic signifiers of gender are employed even by those who hold 
theoretical positions that should give no credence to binaristic theories of gender. 
The rigidity of the gender binarism is central to the arguments of both construction­
ists and essentialists, especially when it comes to making public account of this 
specific case. This rigidity can perhaps be accounted for because it arises in the 
discursive aftermath of a case in which the foundations of gender are radically placed 
into question, and as Alan Hyde notes, it is during such periods that we most 
carefully call forth our definitions of the body (11). Not only do the rules of gender 
culture and gender performance continue to dictate such superficial features as 
clothing and hair, but they also prescribe the positioning of the body and its desires 
on male-female grounds. Indeed, the two clearest themes that were repeated in each 
summary of the case in mass mediated journalism wereJohn/Joan's masculinity as 
seen in her desire to urinate standing up andJohn/Joan's masculinity as witnessed by 
his desire, immediately upon surgical reassignment, to aggressively perform hetero­
sexuality through the purchase of a van with a bed and a bar in order to "lasso some 
ladies" (Angier AI2). To be male or female, then, continues to mean that one 
performs within a fairly rigid set of constraints. Regardless of the multiple examples 
one can give of the plasticity of our culture in terms of gender, and regardless of how 
much behaviors and criticism can work to insist that gender behavior is never 
determined fully in advance, this case illustrates that, at least when mass culture is 
troubled about gender, "signs" of proper gender behavior are readily called upon to 
stabilize cultural fears about gender ambiguity. The disciplinary mechanisms hold­
ing gender steady are powerful indeed. Regardless of what version of theJ ohn/Joan 
story one believes, regardless of what John/Joan did or is doing with his current 
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body, what matters rhetorically and culturally is the way particular activities and 
impulses were repeated and reaffirmed in mass media outlets as evidence of gender 
behavior and misbehavior. 18 As such, they help provide the contours of our cultural 
understanding of gender expectations and its links with public morality. 
Secondly, one can clearly see in these articles the way feminism is represented in 
mass culture, and how feminism is constructed by those who attack it. As I have 
shown, one particular theory-that gender is purely a cultural construct-gets repre­
sented as the main thesis of all feminist theory. Given the articulation of the 
John/Joan case with feminism, criticism of this case is argued to also be an 
undermining of feminism, even though one would be hard pushed to find purely 
discursive theories of gender. Moreover, finding fault with theJohn/Joan case allows 
one to place feminism at fault for the "crimes" of this experiment. That feminism so 
easily fits into these public arguments in this fashion speaks again for the need for a 
complicating of feminism on the public level. 
Finally, in Alan Hyde's recent discussion of the way the body is constructed in 
legal discourse, he notes that his purpose is to encourage "an explosion of competing 
metaphors" of the body, to make a plea "for the multiplication of bodily perfor­
mance" (80, 123) similar to Gordene MacKenzie's call for the destruction of solid 
gender concepts and a move to a "transgender nation" (1) and Celeste Condit's 
recent call for a gender diversity perspective of rhetoric that would emphasize the 
ongoing construction of gender, observing that identity categories "will necessarily 
be fragmentary and context-bound" ("In Praise" 97).1!J Hyde goes so far as to note 
that this multiplicity of performances is nearly inevitable: "Attempts to figure a pure 
or inviolable body, pure because or insofar as it is 'natural' and 'immutable', are 
doomed to fail, are deeply out of touch, with the complicated circuits of will, control, 
and power that condemn the modern body to constant mutability as to weight, 
appearance, and muscle tone" (129-30). What this case illustrates, however, is just 
how strong the constraints against such plasticity, such play, such indeterminacy can 
be. As Susan Bordo notes both in her Unbearable Weight (245-76) and more recently, 
in Twilight Zones (107-35), while it may indeed be the case that plastic surgery and 
other cosmetic options give us the illusion that the body has become far more 
"plastic," increasing the number of options for the public performance of gender, the 
same options are conSistently chosen and the same body types celebrated. Noone 
chooses reverse liposuction; no one decides to have their teeth darkened. Instead, 
while individuals do make such choices as increasing their breast size, they do so as a 
matter of, as Bordo calls it, "free choice under pressure" (Twilight 44). Rather than 
the concept of the "immutable" body being out of touch with "the complicated 
circuit of will, control and power," perhaps it is far more in touch with the gender 
culture we live within than we care to think. At the very least, we must all take 
greater responsibility for the ways that the performance of gender continues to be 
tightly constrained, and morally suspect, and we must continue to find ways to 
complicate those constraints. 
Notes 
The author would like to thank Barbara Biesecker, Bonnie Dow, Judith Hamera, Karen Shimakawa, and the 
anonymous reviewers for thcirinsightful and rigorous comments on earlier drafts of this essay. Thanks, too, to Roy 
Hargrove for Habana. Earlier versions of this essay were presenled al the JW1e 1999 meeting of the International 
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Communication Association in San Francisco, CA and the April 1999 meeting of the Southern Communication 
Studies Association in St. Louis, MO. 
I"Reassignment" is the term used by medical professionals to signify that a child has been designated as being of a 
gender different than that announced at birth. For example, if a child with ambiguous genitalia was first announced as 
male, and a decision is subsequently made to surgically turn the child into a female, the child is said to be reassigned as 
female. 
2The case was more readily known as the "Twins" case before its recent updating. 
'The most interesting and full mass media presentation of the case is an article in Rolling Stone byJohn Colapinto, 
and the fullest account in the scientific community is the article which "broke" the case by Milton Diamond and H. 
Keith Sih'lllundson. 
41 want to be clear that I am using this case, and the discourse that surrounds it, to understand the meaning ofgender 
in contemporary culture. I am not using it to understand what it meanS to be "gender ambiguous" as an experience. 
I would recommend that anyone writing in the area of gender ambiguity or cases of transgender performance see 
Jacob Hale's "Suggested Rules for Non-Transsexuals Writing about Transsexuals, Transsexuality, Transsexualism, or 
Trans _." These can be founel at http://www.actlab.utexas.edu/-sandy/hale.rules.htrnl... 
.II searched the case by using a variety of data bases, including the Reader~, Guide w Periodical Literature, the 
University of California's Melvyl system, and Vanderbilt University's Television News Archives. 
61 should be clear that there is nothing as subtle as a Butlerian deconstruction of the gender-sex division going on in 
public discussions of the case. It is an arh'Ument between these two positions. What I am attempting to do is to suggest 
that the argument about the case illustrates the way in which a specific type of gender perfonnance is reified in this case 
by all those making public arguments. 
7In rhetorical studies circles, my method here amounts to "Clitical rhetoric," as outl.ined by Raymie McKerrow and 
refined by McGee, and Ono and Sloop. I am concentrating on pulling together fragments of popular discussions of the 
case-(dominant) discourses rather than marginal ones. As such, I realize that I am only drawing certain types of 
fragments while not looking necessarily into their use by individuals or within vernacular conversations about the case. 
Further, I should be clear that this essay is not about the "real person" John/Joan-it is about dominant cultural 
representations of that person and the ways that these representations are part of our dominant cultural understandings 
of gender. Further, I am not denying that people can transgressiveI)' perform gender "against the grain" or read this 
case "against the grain." In a sense, this essay is about the constraints we all face in hying to act transgressivel)'. 
~The essay, "The Medical Construction of Gender," is now reprinted as a chapter of Kessler's book, Lessonsfrom the 
Intersexed. A vel')' good recent history of medical discussions of hermaphroditism is Alice Domurat Dreger's 
Hermaphrodites and the Medical Construetio'n ofSex. For other discussions of the gender ideology of science in terms of 
medical discussions of male and female bodies, see both Emily Martin and Bonnie Spannier's essays on the medical 
construction of gender. 
~In her fascinating new history of hermaphroditism, Alice Dreger makes a similar observation and notes that 
modern medicine, "even when it involves psychosocial theory-in fact remains deepI)' materialist, reductionist, and 
determinist in its practical approach to the world, and presumes that a 'successful' female gender requires (and is 
almost guaranteed by) a certain 'female' sex anatomy, and that a 'successful' male gender requires (and is almost 
reqUired by) a certain 'male' sex anatomy" (185). 
IOThere is a point that Kessler raises in a footnote of her own that, while also beyond the scope of this essay, should 
be reinforced and studied elsewhere. Kessler notes in her footnote 9 that "almost all of the published literature on 
intersexed infant case management has been written or cowritten by one researcher, John Money," and, she notes, 
"There are no renegade voices either from within the medical establishment or, thus far, from outside" (7). The case of 
John~Joan, as reported in the essay that finally offered a sh'ong challenge to Money's case (Milton and Diamond) and 
the Rolling Stone article concerning the case, both make it clear that not onl), were other physicians hesitant to challenge 
someone established in the area, but that, as a result, Money was able to report only that evidence that supported his 
theSiS, ignoring evidence that did not support his case. Regardless of where one stands on the question of gender 
fluidity and performance, this case illustrates that, like the humanities, science has a powerful rhetoric and politics that 
is often outside the rigor that it normally claims. While not a "hoax"like the infamous Sokol affair, cases like this one, 
in which reputation makes it impossible to challenge a thesis, are perhaps more dangerous in that people were 
rhetorically and politically frightened to challenge a theory that continues to shape decisions about cutting into 
people's bodies and radically altering their lives. Indeed, H. Keith Sigmundson, one of the co-authors of the follow up 
report on the case ofJohn/Joan that led to the media discussions, claims to have not published an article on the case 
years before, even though he knew the twins case had not been successful because "I was shit-scared ofJohn Money. 
He was the big guy. The guru. I didn't know what it would do to my career" (Colapinto 92). 
IIFor some interesting and indeed frightening cases of how tightly thought out gender behaviors and appearances 
can be for children, especially as revealed in medical discourse, one should see the case studies in Phyllis Burke's 
Gender Slwck. 
12Money's case is made in a number of places. I will draw primarily on articles written for tlle lay audience. See 
Money "Sex," Money and Ehrhardt, Money and Tucker, Money "Ablatio." 
13Diamond's case is made in a number of places. I would recommend Diamond "A Critical," Diamond "Sexual 
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Identity and Sex Roles," Diamond "Sexual Identity, Monozygotic," Diamond and Sigmundson, Diamond "Sexual 
Identity and Sexual Orientation." 
HIt seems to me that the evidence taken from scientific reports and reprinted in mass media publications is of 
significant importance in that, because the mass media articles are shorter and written for a lay audience, thc evidence 
chosen is evidence deemed to bc convincing to that mass audience. 
15Kessler (Lessons, 106), drawing on unpublished work by Fausto-Sterling, argues that gender reassignments are 
made and evaluated on the basis of successful heterosexual performance. 
161should be clear here that while Diamond and Sigmundson see clements of gender being shaped by "nurture," I 
would classify them as "essentialist" in that Diamond's oeuvre has focused on looking at the ways the body's sex 
behaves despite cultural forces. 
17For example, in her analysis of the representation of "feminism" on prime time television shows, Bonnie Dow 
defines feminism broadly as "a set of political ideas and practices-developed through feminist movements, dedicated 
to the progress of women and the transformation of patria.rchy" (xxiii). 
18To clarify, while those who study john/joan and those who know john/joan would obviously find his 
actions/desires to be important, what he "actually" does is not important in tcrms of how the discourse about the case 
represents and reifies cultural understandings ofgender and gender behavior. That is, this essay is aboutjohn10an as a 
discursive re-presentation and not about the actual person. 
190ne might also be tempted to employ Anne Fausto-Sterling's ("Five," "How") call for recognition of at least five 
sex categories. However, while similar, the Fausto-Sterling argument does not work in quite the same fashion. As 
Kessler (90) notes, "The limitation with Fausto-Sterling's proposal is that legitimizing other sets of genitals still gives 
genitals primary signifying status and ignores thc fact that in the everyday world gender attributions are made without 
access to gender inspection. There is no sex, only gender [...1" One interesting way to think through the possibility of 
multiplicities of "humans" on all leve'ls of identificatory discourse, and one that I heartily endorse, is to Celeste 
Condit's move ("Post" 355) to understand human beings as "diverse bodies that learn many languages." 
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